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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CURRENCY IN EAST ASIA: 
PREMISES, IMPLEMENTATION, POSSIBLE PROSPECTS
Th is article covers the issues concerning the process of internationalization of currency in East Asia as 
represented by the Japanese Yen and the Chinese Yuan. Th e Japanese Government began to support 
the process of Yen internationalization in the 1980s. Th e main obstacle to the overall internationaliza-
tion of the Yen was the immaturity of the fi nancial market. Despite the initial success, the liberaliza-
tion of Japan’s fi nancial system ultimately resulted neither in the further strengthening of the Japanese 
economic position on the global stage, nor in the strengthening of the position of Yen in the overseas 
markets. Th e main reason for this failure was US political pressure that imposed accelerated opening 
of fi nancial markets and signifi cantly reduced the capabilities of Japan to counter speculative capital 
infl ows from abroad. At present the Japanese currency hasn’t managed to become a real rival to the 
USD, which resulted from both external and internal reasons. Th e Chinese government began the 
same process in 2009. Th e internationalization of RMB has proceeded largely in line with deliberately 
designed strategy. At the moment the Chinese economy does not fully meet all the criteria for interna-
tionalization of its national currency, but national authorities have managed to move towards the goal 
of RMB internationalization, while simultaneously securing its fi nancial system against risks. Despite 
the achieved success — the decision of IMF to include Yuan in the SDR basket on October 1, 2016 — 
the RMB hasn’t achieved the status of an international reserve currency. Despite certain similarities 
between the Japanese and Chinese experiences, there is a principal diff erence in the approach to the 
formation of a developed fi nancial market which is considered to be a key precondition for the success 
of national currency internationalization. Refs 47. Figs 8.
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С. Ф. Сутырин, В. Н. Коваленко
ИНТЕРНАЦИОНАЛИЗАЦИЯ ВАЛЮТЫ В ВОСТОЧНОЙ АЗИИ:
ПРЕДПОСЫЛКИ, РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ ПРОЕКТА, ВОЗМОЖНЫЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ
В статье рассматриваются вопросы, затрагивающие процесс интернационализации валюты 
в Восточной Азии на примере японской йены и китайского юаня. Правительство Японии нача-
ло целенаправленно осуществлять поддержку процесса интернационализации йены в 1980-е 
годы. Главным препятствием для полномасштабной интернационализации йены был недоста-
точно развитый финансовый рынок. Вопреки первоначальному успеху, либерализация япон-
ской финансовой системы в конечном итоге не привела ни к усилению позиций Японии в гло-
бальной экономике, ни к укреплению позиций йены на зарубежных рынках. Главная причина 
неудачи состояла в чрезмерно ускоренном открытии финансовых рынков под политическим 
давлением США, в связи с чем возможности Японии противостоять притоку спекулятивного 
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капитала из-за границы были значительно снижены. Тем не менее в настоящее время япон-
ская национальная валюта по совокупности внутренних и внешних причин так и не смогла 
превратиться в реального конкурента доллара США. Китайское правительство инициировало 
подобный процесс в 2009 г. Интернационализация юаня в основном осуществлялась на основе 
тщательно проработанной стратегии. В  настоящее время китайская экономика не в  полной 
мере соответствует критериям готовности национальной валюты для интернационализации, 
но  руководство страны, продолжая двигаться к  заявленной цели, одновременно реализует 
меры, призванные снизить возникающие риски. Несмотря на достигнутые успехи — решение, 
принятое руководством МВФ о включении юаня в корзину валют СПЗ с 1 октября 2016 г., на 
практике юань все ещё не приобрел полноценный статус международной резервной валюты. 
Между японским и китайским опытом много общего, однако имеется и принципиальное отли-
чие, которое отражено в разных подходах к формированию финансового рынка. Эффективное 
функционирование последнего является ключевым условием для успешной интернационали-
зации национальной валюты. Библиогр. 47 назв. Ил. 8.
Ключевые слова: юань, йена, интернационализация, финансовые рынки, резервная валюта.
Introduction
In the XX century, national currency internationalization ultimately aiming at gain-
ing the status of international reserve currencies becomes one of the most important fea-
tures for the countries, pretending for the leadership in the global economy. Th is status 
provides respective states with a number of substantial advantages: fi rst of all it reduces 
the sensitivity to external economic shocks, as well as promotes trade with other countries.
In the fi rst half of XX century the USA managed to work this way up and aft er the 
Second World War the country became an undisputed leader of Western world, with the 
USD becoming main global reserve currency. Both the USA economic leadership and 
status of its currency remained unchallenged till late 1960s. Eventually, President Nixon 
decision to quit from gold cover of USD, economic shocks of 1970s, coupled with continu-
ing war in Vietnam, generated demand for the new opportunities in allocation of foreign 
exchange assets. 
During this period currencies of a certain number of countries had strengthened. 
Japan was among them. By the beginning of 1980s it politically remained the USA junior 
partner, while in economic sense in accordance with many parameters acquired the fea-
tures of superpower. Simultaneously, internationalization of the Japanese Yen took place, 
which lead to the start of its transformation into one of international reserve currencies. 
Nevertheless, Japanese government didn’t manage to sustain the initial impulse. Yen had 
never become a real rival to the USD. Famous Japanese economic success of 1980s was 
followed by the “lost decade” of 1990s. 
In the XXI century PRC to a certain extent replicated the Japan’s pattern of 1970–
1980s. Meanwhile unlike the latter, China is far from being US junior political partner. 
More than that, RMB internationalization and liberalization of Chinese fi nancial system is 
carried out on the basis of county’s own vision and a strategy totally diff ering from Wash-
ington Consensus principles. Up to the present PRC government has managed to avoid 
pitfalls on its way to success. Nevertheless, PRC will have to face many serious challenges. 
Within the context of this paper the authors aim to fi nd out whether Japan and China 
fi t some basic requirements for the internationalization of their national currencies, ex-
plore the character of measures taken, evaluate achieved results, as well as to assess pos-
sible prospects in the fi eld. 
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1. Th eoretical background
Internationalization of the national currency is a process of its expansion towards the 
level when the currency on a regular basis is used beyond the national borders both in 
“resident — non-resident” and “non-resident — non-resident” types of transactions. It is 
argued that national currency has successfully completed the process of internationalization, 
if it is able to perform internationally a range of functions. In particular Patricia S. Pollard 
[1997] defi nes three of them — unit of account, store of value, and medium of exchange. 
George S. Tavlas and Y. Ozeki [Tavlas, Ozeki, 1992, p. 2] add to this list yet another one, 
namely mean of payments. Besides, as Peter B. Kenen [2012] argues, it’s important to 
distinguish between a country that hosts an international fi nancial center and that has 
international currency. 
More specifi cally:
1) To secure unit of account function, national currency shall be used for invoicing 
deals and denominating diff erent fi nancial market instruments.
2) To secure store of value function, non-residents  — both physical and legal 
entities — shall have a possibility to keep without any limitations their savings either in 
this currency or fi nancial tools denominated in this currency. In their turn, residents of the 
country of issue shall have a right to off er their fi nancial tools denominating in national 
currency at the foreign markets. At the same time, all their public off ers denominated 
in national currency shall be judicable in respective foreign countries. Besides, laws and 
rules, existing there, shall allow any non-resident companies, as well as physical entities, 
to issue shares and debt securities in the currency of the country, assuming that issued 
securities are regulated by laws of the country of issue. Ultimately, all these factors should 
promote establishing of the Euromarket of internationalized currency.
3) To secure medium of exchange function, the state shall eliminate all restrictions on 
the freedom to buy or sell its country’s currency by resident or non-resident, whether in 
the spot or forward market, i. e. provide free convertibility of the national currency. At the 
same time this condition allows existence of restrictions, introduced by national fi nancial 
regulator, such as open foreign-currency position requirement for resident banks. 
4) To secure mean of payments function, existing regular business practices in 
the respective country shall assume that resident companies issue invoices in national 
currency for the exported goods (with exception for standard exchange commodities 
traditionally being priced in USD, e. g. oil). 
Resulting from successful internationalization, national currency gradually begins to 
perform a function of international reserves. Th e states issuing reserve currencies fi rst 
of all enjoy a privilege to fi nance emerging balance of payment defi cits not only with the 
offi  cial gold and currency reserves, but also with their own moneys. Gaining the status 
of reserve currency de facto implies interest-free credits for respective country from 
other members of international community. On top of that, wide range of international 
investors (fi rst and foremost foreign governments, large transnational companies and 
banks) purchase state securities of the respective country. In other words, the country 
in commend over one of world reserve currencies inevitably begins to play a role of the 
global banker. According to G. Tavlas and Y. Ozeki [Tavlas, Ozeki, 1992, р. 2] “…the nation 
is in position to accept short-term liquid deposits denominated in its currency from, and 
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to supply long-term loans and investments in its currency to, the rest of the world. It is the 
process of international liquidity transformation, whereby nation provides liquidity to the 
rest of the world, because of the willingness of foreigners to hold its liquid liabilities, while 
providing loans and investments to the rest of the world that underlies the notion that a 
country can serve as word banker”. 
A right to become the global banker is really a privilege open to just few. R. Mundell 
[1983, p.189] emphasized this point arguing that ‘it is a fact of historical tradition that 
the top currency is provided by the top powers’. Actually promotion of the USD up to 
the global reserve currency took place not just in the process of the American economy 
transformation into the most developed one in the world, but also within the shift  from 
Pax Britanica concept to Pax Americana one. 
In order to carry out our study it is necessary to defi ne main criteria of maturity of a 
certain national currency for internationalization. For that purpose we would fi rst of all 
refer to the opinion presented by R. Mun dell [1983, p.189] in his “International Monetary 
Options”. Th is approach was specifi ed with respect to Chinese currency by G. Frankel 
[2011] in a paper “Historical Precedents for Internationalization of the RMB”. Th e latter in 
particular claims “Th ree fundamentals determine whether a currency is suited for inter-
national status. Th e fi rst is the size of the home economy, as measured by GDP or trade. 
Th e second is confi dence in the value of the currency, as measured by the long-term trend 
in its exchange rate, the variability of the exchange rate, the country’s long-term infl ation 
rate, and its position as an international net creditor. Th e third is the development of its 
fi nancial markets, particularly depth, liquidity, dependability and openness”. 
Th ese three criteria will be used further in a present study.
2. Internationalization of Japanese Yen
By the end of the II World War Japanese economy suff ered signifi cantly. More than 
that, the country lost its national sovereignty being occupied by the USA. In spite of the 
fact that Japan had its own government, the latter was under the permanent American 
control. A range of substantial reforms was implemented in the country in 1945–1947. In 
particular, in 1945 dissolution of Zaibatsu took place, destroying the largest national con-
glomerates, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and some others. Th at made 
the whole Japanese business less dynamic and internationally competitive, especially vis-
à-vis American companies. Agricultural reform resulted in redistribution of land from 
large landholder estates in favor of renters with the state playing a role of mediator. In 
1945 a law on labor unions legalized struggle of the employees for their rights. School 
reform increased compulsory education from 6 to 9 years.
All these transformations took place in the extremely diffi  cult economic conditions. 
Breakdown and economic chaos of the fi rst post-war years forced Japanese authorities 
to use extensively administrative tools, in particular price control over basic consumer 
goods, energy and a range of raw materials. Th is policy was also supported by the oc-
cupation authorities as it allowed to decrease public discontent under conditions of infl a-
tion. S. M. Nikitin and M. P. Stepanova [Nikitin, Stepanova, 1992, p.11] sensibly argued 
that “In its development Japan widely used some kind of a “planned-market” economy 
concept. Th e country didn’t reject the policy of powerful, including administrative, state 
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regulation, just because it has certain elements of planning, such as priority ranking, task 
oriented benefi ts, concentration of resources at strategic goals. A set of methods aff ecting 
entrepreneurs’ decisions concerning allocation of resources aiming at the expansion of 
certain industries while contracting the others was developed and successfully used. Th ese 
methods didn’t substitute market mechanism, but supported, completed and adjusted its 
functioning”.
In 1947–1949 the country experienced fast economic growth accompanied the sig-
nifi cant expansion of demand for raw materials and capital. In 1949 so-called “stabiliza-
tion” or, in fact, shock therapy was performed. It included in particular balanced budget 
with drastic reduction of subsidies to manufacturing industries and fi xed exchange rate 
of 360 JPY/USD [Reuters, 2010]. Joseph Dodge, economic advisor of occupation admin-
istration, became an ideologist of all these measures. Th ey resulted in a recession, fortu-
nately a short-term one. Korean War (1950–1953) generated substantial US demand for 
the Japanese industrial products, allowing the country to launch a mechanism of revival. 
Lengthy export boom of 1950s–1970s, lead to the accumulation of a large stock of 
USD. Th anks to that Japan in 1964 was able to introduce free convertibility of Yen for 
current transactions and gradually began active operations at the international fi nancial 
markets. At the same time full-scale fi nancial liberalization was not yet on agenda. In 
particular, transactions with outside world were still regulated by the law No. 228 of De-
cember 1949 [Cabinet secretariat of Japan, 1949]. It stipulated foreign exchange control 
procedure, mainly seriously restricting possibilities for national business to invest abroad. 
At the same time, it allowed Japan to use available foreign exchange reserves effi  ciently 
in accordance with national priorities, fi rst of all to fi nance import of technologies and 
sophisticated equipment. 
It is well known, that Bretton-Woods system existed for more than 25 years, up to the 
American Administration decision of 15 Aug. 1971 to terminate of dollar-to-gold con-
vertibility. Th at provided Japan and some European countries with new opportunities pre-
sented by emerging demand for alternative to USD reserve currencies. Meanwhile it took 
the Land of the Rising Sun some time to start exploiting these opportunities.
By the beginning of 1980s Japan accumulated signifi cant fi nancial resources consisted 
of both households and corporate savings. Simultaneously, foreign exchange reserves also 
increased substantially from 4,399 bln USD in 1970 up to 25,232 bln USD in 1980 [Statis-
tics Bureau of Japan, 2014]. Success of Japanese business in trade with the USA resulted 
in constantly growing defi cit of American foreign trade balance. Under the circumstances 
the US Government again and again required from Japan to appreciate Yen against USD 
(in order to reduce competitiveness of Japanese industry), as well as advocated Japanese 
fi nancial markets liberalization.
2.1. Liberalization of Japanese fi nancial system
Japan started partial liberalization of its fi nancial system already in 1970s. International 
experience clearly demonstrated that opening of domestic fi nancial market for the foreign 
investors was always accompanied with a risk for the country to depend upon foreign 
speculators. Taking into consideration long-term forced Japanese dependence from the 
United States in many key economic aspects, it is far from being strange that suggestions 
of comprehensive fi nancial liberalization were strongly opposed by some representatives 
of national elite. Nevertheless, in 1980  the fi rst signifi cant step was made  — Foreign 
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Exchange and Trade Control Act canceled substantial part of previously existed restrictions 
(except those directly connected with national security) [Roderick, Seaman…, 1985]. It 
was followed by some other measures aimed at capital market liberalization. At least some 
of them should be named separately [Hosh, Rashyap, 1999]:
1981. Warrant bonds were introduced.
1982. Criteria for the issuance of unsecured bonds by Japanese residents in overseas 
market were clarifi ed.
1983. Eligibility standards for issuance of unsecured convertible bonds were relaxed.
1984. “Real Demand Rule” for foreign exchange was lift ed; permission of swap 
agreements and hedging of forward foreign exchange transactions was introduced; 
collateral requirement for non-resident issue of Euro-yen bonds was dropped; standards 
for issuing Samurai Bonds by private companies were relaxed.
Apart from that, signifi cant pro-liberalization changes aff ected the banking sector. In 
particular they included [Hosh, Rashyap, 1999]:
1980. Permission of medium and long-term impact loans for foreign exchange banks. 
1982. Permission to lend yen overseas on a long-term basis (previous priority system 
for overseas Yen lending was abolished).
1983. Permission of over-the-counter sale of government bonds to the general public; 
permission for banks to affi  liate with mortgage securities companies.
1984. Securities licenses to subsidiaries/affi  liates of some foreign banks with branches 
in Japan (equity stakes limited to 50 %); permission for foreign and Japanese banks to issue 
Euro-Yen certifi cates of deposits (CDs) with maturities of 6 months or less; permission for 
banks to deal on their own account in public bonds. 
Due to implementation of these measures, Japanese fi nancial market began to 
integrate into the global market. In other words, Japanese got a right to invest abroad 
almost without restrictions, while foreigners got a right to work actively at the Japanese 
fi nancial market. All of that took place against the background of continuing export 
expansion of Japan as well as extension of the area, where Yen was used for the settlements 
with foreign economic agents.
In order to estimate whether Japan was mature enough for the internationalization 
of its currency before the conclusion in May 1984 of an agreement between Japan and the 
USA on liberalization of Japanese fi nancial markets, let’s make an analysis using off ered 
above criteria.
Size of the national economy
In 1970s Japan became one of the leading global economic powers. Figure 
1 demonstrates this fact clearly enough.
Existing data suggest that during the period when the British pound sterling was 
the main international reserve currency (1870–1913), UK accounted for about 9 % of the 
global GDP. In its turn the USA increased its respective share from 9 % in 1870 up to 19 % 
in 1913. Under the circumstances there was no surprise that aft er the end of the I World 
War USD strengthened its position in contest for the status of No1 international reserve 
currency. In a way during second half of XX century the Land of the Rising Sun started 
to replicate US leap increasing its share in the global GDP from 3 % in 1950 up to 10 % in 
1980 and later (aft er the beginning of fi nancial liberalization) up to the peak of 17 % by 
1988. In addition to that, by 1983 Japan became No3 exporting country on the globe in 
comparison with 6th place (8 %) in 1965 [Norrlof, 2010, p.23]. 
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Taking all these facts under consideration one might conclude that in general Japan 
met the fi rst out of three above-mentioned criteria to check the maturity of its national 
currency for internationalization.
Confi dence in a value of the currency
1. Th e long-term trend in the exchange rate 
In order to get more comprehensive perception in addition to retrospective USD/Yen 
exchange rate data we shall use also USD/£ exchange rate data for the same period of time. 
Figure 2  indicates that Japanese currency strengthened vis-à-vis American one 
up to 1977. Initially it was not a matter of any serious concern for the government of 
Figure 1. Dynamics of share change of the largest economies into the global GDP in 
1820–1990s, %
N o t e :  C alculations of the authors. Sources: [IMF, 2014; Maddison, 2007, p. 382]. 
Figure 2. USD/Yen (column) and USD/Great Britain Pound sterling (line) in 1972–1990
S o u r c e s : [Bank of Japan, 2014; Currency converter, 2014]. 
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Japan. Meanwhile, as late as 1976–1977  monetary authorities started active currency 
interventions to prevent further Yen appreciation that might have negatively infl uenced 
the competitiveness of national exporters. Nevertheless, in general during 1970s–1980s 
Yen tended to strengthen against USD in contrast to respective dynamics of British pound. 
Th e latter also appeared to be more volatile. 
2. Th e long-term infl ation rate
Th e authors of the present paper share frequently expressed view that consumer price 
index (CPI) allows to assess stability of national currency fairly enough. Respective data 
for Japan, United States, and Great Britain are presented below (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Infl ation dynamics in Japan, Great Britain and the USA in 1970–1990, %
S o u r c e s : [E-Stat. Portal of offi  cial statistics of Japan, 2014; US Infl ation calculator, 2014; Historical UK infl ation 
rates …, 2014].
During 1971–1979  average CPI for Japan equaled to 9.24 % in comparison with 
8.02 %  — for the USA and 11.57 % for the UK. Meanwhile, starting from 1980  Japan 
experienced the lowest infl ation rate among three countries under review. 
3. Th e position as an international net creditor
In this case Net Assets of International Investment Position indicator is the most 
suitable as a criterion for the purpose of our analysis.
Figure 4 clearly demonstrates for the period since the second half of 1980s permanent 
increase of Japanese Net Assets of International Investment Position. In other words Japan 
was gradually transforming into the large-scale international creditor. At the same time 
respective US indicator not just contracted but turned into negative. 
Taking all these facts under consideration one might conclude that in general Japan 
met the second out of three above-mentioned criteria to check the maturity of its national 
currency for internationalization. 
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2.2. Maturity of Japanese fi nancial markets
During 1970s some objective factors pushed the Japanese government towards a 
path of fi nancial market liberalization. Aft er 1973 oil-price shock, national economy rate 
of growth seriously contracted and the investment activity in a corporate sector slowed 
down. Under these conditions accompanied by budget defi cit the public sector became 
a net borrower. So the government had to redirect the personal savings of citizens from 
commercial investments to government bills. As S. Eken [Eken, 1984, p. 506] claimed, the 
amount of government bonds outstanding rose eightfold in absolute terms for the period 
of 1974/75–1981/82 fi scal years (from 7 % up to 32 % of gross national product).
All that stimulated a fast development of Japanese bond market (both primary and 
secondary). To contain the debt-servicing burden, state-controlled interest rates on new 
issues were oft en kept below market-clearing level, leading to lower profi t for the banks 
[Eken, 1984, p. 508]. So the latter lost in competition with other fi nancial institutions. At 
the late of 1970s Japanese leadership in order to counteract this trend started to liberal-
ize domestic fi nancial market. Among most signifi cant pro-liberalization measures there 
were in particular the following ones: 1) permission for the syndicated banks to resale 
government bonds; 2) development of the repo market of government bonds; 3) develop-
ment of the market for CDs (unregulated interest rates).
At the same time, even implementation of the Foreign Exchange and trade Control Law 
in 1980 didn’t eliminate various restrictions. For example, any real Euro-Yen market did not 
operate: the residents couldn’t buy Euro-Yen certifi cates of deposit issued by non-resident 
bank, Euro-Yen commercial paper market didn’t exist as well. Euro-Yen lending was strictly 
regulated in particular with respect to issue of Euro-Yen bonds and forward foreign exchange 
Figure 4. Net Assets of International Investment Position of Japan and USA in 
1986–1990, mln USD
S o u r c e s : [Ministry of Finance of Japan, 2014; e-Statistics Portal, 2014].
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transactions. A signifi cant number of reporting and preliminary approvals required for some 
other transactions. Th e existence of strict foreign exchange control made free movement of 
capital impossible preventing creation of a market with suffi  cient liquidity and transparency. 
All in all, at this stage Japanese fi nancial markets were largely isolated from the exter-
nal counterparts. In other words, being in line with the fi rst and second criteria to check the 
maturity of its national currency for internationalization Japan did not meet the third one.
2.3. Did Japan succeed in internationalization of its currency?
In the fi rst half of 1980s the USA experienced serious economic problems and newly 
elected president Ronald Reagan started to implement a new economic course, which 
was later called “reaganomics”. Th e most important components of this course were tax 
reduction, attracting of foreign investment, growth military expenditures, as well as 
certain measures aimed at the reduction of defi cit in trade with Japan. As a matter of fact 
the United States were really interested in a radical liberalization of Japanese fi nancial 
markets, as in this case capital infl ow would induce appreciation of Yen, what in its turn 
could decrease US trade balance defi cit. Besides, the Japanese investors would get much 
better opportunities to invest into the USA economy, even in case of shortage of long-term 
fi nancial resources at the territory of their own country. 
In such a situation Japan had a variety of options. In fact, it was a choice between 
diff erent forms of national fi nancial system liberalization. According to Shinji Takagi, the 
Japanese “…preferred a much slower pace of reform than the Americans were willing to 
accept” [Takagi, 1994]. However the decision was made in favor of a radical one. According 
to Russian experts A. Anisimov, N. Vasiliev and A. Nagorniy [Yena i dollar, 2001] “…that was 
the choice, to which the USA stirred Japan, as the USA realized its advantage in fi nancial 
manipulations. Liberalization came in as an “external rush” of Japanese capital. Th at was 
a “trap”, in which political and fi nancial leadership of the USA tried to stir its Japanese 
“partners” by stimulating myths about attractiveness of American stock market as well as 
by means of exaggerating of real “power” of Japanese fi nancial and industrial structures”.
Th e most signifi cant step was made in May 1984 when Japan and the USA signed 
an inter-governmental agreement on liberalization of the Japanese fi nancial markets. Th e 
Agreement stipulated the following measures [Osugi, 1990]:
1) Liberalization of international banking business. Active development of Euro-Yen 
market resulting in appreciation of Yen vis-à-vis USD.
2) Liberalization of a debt market. Permission for non-residents to issue their own 
bonds denominated in the Japanese Yen. Promotion of Euro-Yen bond market. 
3) Liberalization of the internal foreign exchange control. Cancellation of limits for 
swaps. 
4) Elimination of the restrictions for Japanese residents to purchase foreign debt 
securities.
5) Better access to the Japanese market for foreign fi nancial institutions. 
6) Establishing of off -shore Yen market. 
7) Liberalization of domestic fi nancial markets. First of all, elimination of any deposits 
interest rate limits as well as elimination of barriers between commercial and investment 
banking.
Implementation of above-mentioned pro-liberalization measures at the fi rst stage led to 
the ambiguous results. On the one hand, Yen/USD exchange rate increased from 244.17 in 
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1984 up to 141.26 in 1990 (see: Figure 4). Japanese gold and foreign exchange reserves grew 
from 26.31 bln USD in 1984 up to 77.05 bln USD in 1990 [Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2014]. 
Yen’s share in overall international reserves increased in 1991 up to 9 % [Frankel, 2011]. On 
the other hand, “economic bubbles” appeared on several speculative markets. 
As for foreign investment, international speculative capital came to the Japanese 
stock market resulting in impressive growth of Nikkei index from 8016 in 1982 [Siddiqui, 
2012] up to 38916 in 1989 [Economics&Finance, 2012]. At the same time signifi cant and 
fast growing fi nancial resources moved from Japan to the variety of foreign countries. 
Th us, Japanese FDI outfl ows increased from about 8 bln USD in 1982 up to almost 70 bln 
USD in 1989. Total stock of Japanese outward investments in 1990 equaled to more than 
300 bln USD with the USA accounting for more than 136 bln USD [Bayoumi, Lipworth, 
1997]. All that took place against the background of relocation of main Japanese domestic 
investment fl ows from industry to the fi nancial sector and real estate.
In spite of that, the Japanese banking sector did not avoid certain problems. Before 
the liberalization in 1980s banks were the main suppliers of fi nancial resources for corpo-
rate sector as corporate securities market was overregulated and public off ering of bonds 
overseas was prohibited. Aft er this prohibition was abandoned at the end of 1980s and 
public off ering of corporate bonds and other securities was allowed both domestically and 
abroad, this type of fi nancing became the most attractive for large Japanese companies due 
to relatively low cost of the resources. 
Under the circumstances Japanese banks found themselves in a rather diffi  cult situa-
tion of a drastic reduction of loans provided to the most solvent customers accompanied 
by a stable amount of deposits made by Japanese investors. To balance their assets and li-
abilities the commercial banks had to start giving loans to less reliable debtors. Ultimately 
when a “speculative bubble” in the stock market burst up in April 1990, the problem of 
bad debts became highly relevant for the Japanese bank system opening a new stage in the 
economic life of the country. 
Many experts and politicians considers that 1990s was a “lost decade” for Japan 
[Meckler, Weisman, 2009]. Particularly it is proved by the data, provided by analyst 
V. Crag in 1998 «…during the late 1980s, monthly trading volumes in Tokyo and New 
York were approximately equal; today (1998) Tokyo’s volume is approximately 20 percent 
of New York’s…approximately 18 percent of total trade in Japanese equities is now done 
in London, a threefold increase in the past fi ve years» [Craig, 1998]. 
So, the Japanese version of accelerated fi nancial liberalization realized in 1980s with 
the further “speculative bubble blowing-off ” and a long-term stagnation of the country 
in 1990s did not lead the process of Yen internationalization to the expected positive out-
come. Yen’s share in the international reserves was 3.9 % [IMF, 2014] in 2013 in compari-
son with 9 % in 1991. In 2013 Yen accounted for roughly the same as the British Pound 
4 % [IMF, 2014] in overall international reserves. According to J. Ross1 “….in 1980 Japan 
accounted for almost as high a share of world trade as all the other developing countries 
in Asia combined. Since 1986 the share of Japan in world exports has declined sharply — 
falling from 10.3 per cent in that year to 5.3 per cent in 2007. In 1980  the developing 
Asian countries, including China, accounted for 8.3 per cent of world exports and Japan 
for 6.5 per cent. By 2006 the developing Asian economies, including China, accounted for 
1 Senior Fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China.
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23.7 per cent of world exports and Japan for only 5.3 per cent. In 1980 Japan’s exports were 
equivalent to 78 per cent of those from the developing Asian countries, while by 2006 Ja-
pan’s exports were equivalent to only 22 per cent of those of the combined exports of the 
developing Asian countries” [Ross, 2014]. 
On the basis of all above mentioned we would argue that regardless of the initial 
success, the Japanese Yen failed to challenge global dominance of USD. Nevertheless Yen 
became one of the most important reserve currencies of the second tier competing with 
the British Pound, the Australian dollar, and the Swiss franc. Th is fact strongly correlates 
with the relative decline of Japanese role in the international political and economic hier-
archy of 1990s–2000s. 
3. Internationalization of the Chinese Yuan
Unlike Japan, China turned out to be among the winning countries aft er the World 
War II. Nevertheless, until comprehensive reforms were launched in 1978 Chinese economy 
has largely been an autarchic one with fi nancial system isolated from the external world.
At the fi rst stage of reforms, a multi-level banking system began to be gradually 
erected. It started with establishing of specialized state-owned commercial banks and the 
People’s Bank of China insensibly abandoning the functions not connected with regula-
tion and control. Besides, since from the beginning of reforms individuals and enterprises 
started to save and were ready to invest their money in order to get additional income. 
Substantial eff orts aimed at introduction and further development of fi nancial market 
tools were introduced. 
In 1981  the People’s Bank of China issued state bonds. During 1980s commercial 
bills had been circulated actively. In 1987 short-term bonds markets for enterprises were 
opened in 29 cities. In December 1990 and July 1991 stock exchanges were founded in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. In the 1990s China went through the process of establishing 
a full-scale modern fi nancial system. When during the period of 1991–1995 legislation 
stipulating the performance of commercial banks came into eff ect, the foundations of 
currently existing fi ve-level banking system were formed. In accordance with the law on 
Central bank adopted in 1995, the People’s Bank of China has full autonomy with respect 
to monetary policy tools. 
In 2003 the acting legislation was amended to strengthen a role of the People’s Bank 
of China in the sphere of eff ective monetary policy. In addition to that, China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) were founded. Th e PRC had almost 
completed the foundation of all required infrastructure for the full-scale functioning of fi -
nancial markets by 2008. At the same time, despite all achievements the Chinese fi nancial 
system still continued to be relatively closed vis-à-vis outside world. Internationalization 
of the RMB was rather a subject of discussions on a future promising project than an issue 
on a practical agenda. But subsequent events changed the situation drastically. 
3.1. Liberalization of the Chinese fi nancial system in 2009–2015
Great Recession of 2008–2009 with USD credibility crisis as one of its dimensions 
generated substantial additional demand for a new reserve currency. So the Chinese 
leadership decided to use this opportunity. Within historically a very short period of time 
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a range of active steps aimed at Yuan liberalization was made. Th ese steps had to secure 
for CNY at least the status of regional reserve currency.
With respect to capital market liberalization the most signifi cant measures included 
the following [Avdokushin, Kovalenko, 2011, p. 43–49]:
2009 May. Foreign banks pioneered by HSBC and Bank of East Asia were allowed to 
issue bonds denominated in the Chinese Yuan. 
2009  September. China purchased 50  bln USD packages of the IMF bonds paying 
RMB instead of the USD. 
PRC Government started placing of 6  bln CNY (875  mln USD) state bonds 
denominated in Yuan in Hong Kong. 
2010  July. Th e People’s Bank of China and Bank of China (Hong Kong) signed an 
agreement according to which non-bank fi nancial institutions got permission to open 
accounts in RMB without any limitations. Besides, all Yuan holders (both corporate and 
private) were allowed to transfer funds for any purposes from/to their accounts in CNY in 
diff erent Hong Kong banks.
2010 August. PRC Government announced that non-resident banks (Central banks, 
clearing banks and banks taking participation into cross-border trade) under certain 
conditions would be allowed to purchase bonds denominated in Yuan at the domestic 
Chinese market. 
2011 January. Th e People’s Bank of China allowed the Chinese companies and banks 
participating in the program of cross-border trade settlement in Yuan to use RMB for 
direct investments abroad.
2011 December. Investors from Hong Kong — subsidiaries of the Chinese companies 
with the status of Renminbi Qualifi ed Foreign Institutional Investor (RQII) — were allowed 
to use Yuan from their accounts outside of the continental China for investments into the 
PRC stock market (including inter-bank bond market). Previously, in order to make these 
investments the companies had to receive permission from China Security Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).
2012 April. HSBC Holdings PLC issued the fi rst RMB denominated bonds in London 
with the total amount of 1 bln CNY. 
2013 March. List of investors from Hong Kong operating as RQIIs was extended to 
include subsidiaries owned by banks and insurance companies from the continental China 
as well as securities companies with Hong Kong residence. In addition to that, the People’s 
Bank of China allowed Qualifi ed Foreign Institutional Investors QFIIs2 to invest in the 
interbank bond market. Th us, by March 2014 sixty [ICBC, 2014] companies received the 
right to invest in China as RQIIs (total quota was 580 billion Yuan [ICBC, 2014]). On top 
of that by June 2015–289 [China XBR, 2015] fi nancial institutions have been approved by 
the CSRC as the Commissioners of QFIIs. Th e total size of the investment quota for the 
QFII scheme participants was $ 80 billion USD [CSRC, 2012]. 
2 According to http://fi nance.mapsofworld.com. Th e Qualifi ed Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) 
system was started in China in 2002. Th e system was designed and implemented by People’s Bank of China 
and China Securities Regulatory Commission. Th is system provided huge opportunity to the foreign insti-
tutional investors in the Chinese capital markets. Th e rules regarding the entry of foreign institutional inves-
tors in Chinese market have been modifi ed in 2006 in order to bring more foreign investors in the China 
capital markets to add much width and depth to the market.
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Certain initiatives relating to the range of permissible activities for Yuan international 
payments were also very signifi cant from the point of view of RMB internationalization. 
Most signifi cant of them were the following: 
2009  April. Th e State Council of China announced a program of using Yuan as a 
clearing currency for international trade.
2010 June. Th e People’s Bank of China issued a draft  project on application of Yuan in 
settlements with all countries of the world. Th e list of regions and cities whose residents 
were given the right to make payments to foreign countries in Yuan was expanded from 
fi ve cities to 20 administrative units.
2010 August. Th e PRC government declared that the non-resident banks (Central banks, 
clearing banks and banks moderating cross-border trade), under the certain conditions 
would be able to purchase bonds denominated in Yuan in the Chinese internal market. 
2010  December. Th e PRC government abolished the obligation for exporters to 
convert their foreign currency earnings into Yuan in order to reduce infl ationary pressure.
2011 March. Premier Wen Jiabao at the NPC session said that during the current year 
the right to use RMB in international trade settlements would be given to all enterprises 
and companies throughout the PRC. Th at right was actually granted.
2011  December. Japan and China decided to support application of their national 
currencies (instead of USD) in transactions between the Chinese and the Japanese 
companies. 
2012 April. Th e People’s bank of China announced plans to launch a new payments 
system called China International Payment System (CIPS) modeled on the U. S. CHIPS 
network. 
2012  June. Th e operating hours of the RMB real-time gross settlement system in 
Hong Kong were extended to 15 hours from 10 hours a day to meet rising demand for 
payments and settlements.
2012 August. China and Taiwan signed an agreement to establish RMB and Taiwan 
dollar (TWD) clearing system. Th e Taipei branch of Bank of China was designated as a 
clearing bank in Taiwan in December.
2013 February. China’s central bank appointed the Singapore branch of the Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China Ltd the RMB clearing bank in Singapore; beginning of 
transactions in Yuan between authorized fi nancial institutions in Taiwan and China.
2014  June. China Construction Bank was designated as a clearing bank for CNY 
transactions in London.
2014 July. China and South Korea agreed to set up a RMB clearing system in South 
Korea. 
2015 March. Th e establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
2015  October. China International Payment System (CIPS) was launched by 8th 
October.
Policy aimed at reduction of various restrictions on international settlements in 
CNY logically enough resulted in a rapid increase in number of Yuan swap agreements 
concluded between the People’s Bank of China and the Central banks of various countries. 
Signifi cant steps in this direction are listed below.
2009 March. China’s State Council decided to transform Shanghai into an international 
fi nancial center by 2020. Th e People’s Bank of China signed six-currency swap agreements 
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totally amounting to 650 billion CNY (with Argentina, Belarus, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Republic of Korea). 
2011 April. Th e People’s Bank of China signed an agreement on reciprocal currency 
swaps with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (25 billion CNY) and the Central Bank of 
the Republic of Uzbekistan (700 million CNY).
2012 January. Th e People’s Bank of China signed an agreement on currency swaps 
with the Central bank of United Arab Emirates (35 billion CNY). 
2012 March. Th e People’s Bank of China signed an agreement on currency swaps with 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (25 billion CNY).
2012 June. REPO transactions in RMB were launched in Hong Kong. 
2012 August. Heads of the Central banks of China and Taiwan signed a memorandum 
of understanding regarding start of transactions in Yuan.
2013 March. Th e People’s Bank of China signed an agreement on currency swaps with 
the Central Bank of Brazil (190 billion CNY) and the Central Bank of Australia (31 billion 
USD).
2013 June. Th e People’s Bank of China and the Bank of England signed an agreement 
on currency swaps (200 billion CNY).
2013 September. Th e People’s Bank of China signed an agreement on currency swap 
lines with the Central banks of Albania (2 billion CNY) and Hungary (10 billion CNY).
2013 October. Th e People’s Bank of China and the European Central Bank signed an 
agreement on currency swaps (350 billion CNY). 
2014  October. Th e People’s Bank of China and Central Bank of Russia signed an 
agreement on currency swaps (150 billion CNY).
2014 November. Th e People’s Bank of China and Bank of Canada signed an agreement 
on currency swaps (200 billion CNY).
2015  November. Th e People’s Bank of China and the South African Reserve Bank 
signed an agreement on currency swaps (30 billion CNY).
According to Mr. Hu Xiaolian [China Securities Journal, 2014], deputy governor of 
the People’s Bank of China at the end of 2014 China signed bilateral agreements on mutual 
currency swaps (in most cases with 3-years duration) for 3  trillion CNY with twenty-
eight Central banks and Monetary authorities of diff erent countries. Th is policy started 
to generate tangible results fast enough. By September 2015, the RMB strengthened its 
position as the forth-ranked global payments currency with a new record-high activity 
share of 2.8 % (from 2.06 % in January 2015) [BOFIT, 2015]. According to SWIFT’s latest 
RMB tracker [SWIFT, 2015], Yuan is at the moment the second oft en used currency 
between Japan and China/Hong Kong with the RMB accounting for 7 % of settlements, by 
value, compared to 3 % two years ago. As a kind of culmination of this upward trend IMF 
in November 2015 decided to include Yuan in the SDR basket on October 1, 2016 with 
currency weight equal to 10.92 %. 
Nevertheless the RMB’s internationalization process is not a faultless one. So, 
according to Zacks Equity Research [NASDAQ, 2015] Th e People’s Bank of China recently 
warned several foreign banks (among them most likely  — Citigroup Inc. C, Deutsche 
Bank AG DB, HSBC Holdings plc HSBC, Standard Chartered PLC SCBFF, Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group, and BNP Paribas SA), asking them to suspend some of their 
foreign-exchange activities (related to onshore-off shore operations in RMB) for a three-
month period ending in March 2016. Th is decision of the regulator aimed to cut increasing 
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 5. Экономика. 2016. Вып. 1 35
spread between onshore and off shore exchange rate of RMB. It has been widening since 
Yuan devaluation in August 2015 reaching 1.8 % by the end of December 2015 [NASDAQ, 
2015]. Besides, notwithstanding eff orts of Chinese money authority Yuan still is out of the 
group of key reserve currencies. According to Global Finance share of “other currencies” 
(including RMB) in composition of global foreign exchange reserves in mid-2015 equaled 
to just 3.11 %, compared to 5.56 % [Global Finance Magazine, 2015] three years earlier.
In order to estimate whether China was mature enough for the internationalization 
of its currency, let’s make an analysis using criteria off ered above.
Size of the national economy
Chinese contribution to the global GDP since the beginning of a new millennium 
increased substantially. Figure 5 clearly illustrate this fact. 
Figure 5. Share of the largest national economies in the global GDP in 2000–2013
S o u r c e :  [IMF, 2014].
In 2010  for the fi rst time China offi  cially became the second largest economy on 
the globe aft er the USA, moving Japan to the third position. In addition to that, starting 
from 2009 China has had No1 rank in the list of leading merchandise exporters, while in 
1990 the country had occupied the 14th place [CSD SAR HKG, 2012]. In 2013 Chinese 
share in the global merchandise export equaled to 14.7 % [WTO, 2015]. 
Available historical experience suggests that as soon as the share of a certain country in 
the international trade exceeds 8–10 %, the role of its currency in the world starts to increase 
sharply. Indeed, when the USA’s share in world trade had exceeded 10 %, USD began to 
displace British pound as the world reserve currency. Similarly, aft er the share of Japan in 
global merchandise exports exceeded 8 %, Yen started its active internationalization. 
Taking all these facts under consideration one might suggest that China met the fi rst 
out of three above-mentioned criteria to check the maturity of its national currency for 
internationalization. 
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Confi dence in a value of the currency
1. Th e long-term trend in the exchange rate.
One of the most important factors defi ning the confi dence of foreign investors in 
respective national currency is stability of its exchange rate against the major world 
currencies in the historical retrospect. 
Figure 6. RMB/USD exchange rate in 1999–2013
S o u r c e s : [National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015; State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 
2015].
Th e graph (Figure 6) demonstrates that the exchange rate under review in 1999–
2004 had not changed at all. Th en, in 2005–2008, RMB — due to impressive growth of the 
Chinese economy as well as policies of the People’s Bank of China aimed at maintaining 
macroeconomic stability  — had been getting stronger. Nevertheless, we cannot claim 
that above mentioned requirement is completely fulfi lled as a foreign exchange market in 
China has operated under a strict government control. 
At the moment Yuan has not reach the level of full convertibility being convertible for 
current account transactions since 1996. Th at allowed foreign companies to carry out foreign 
trade operations as well as to carry out the repatriation of their profi ts. Chinese authorities 
stated that RMB would become fully convertible currency only aft er the state could 
eff ectively regulate the fi nancial markets. Th e State Council statement of 25.03.2009 that 
declared a plan to promote Shanghai up to the status of international fi nancial center by 
2020 can serve as an indirect indicator of the prospects of Yuan convertibility. Th us, this 
requirement is likely be completely fulfi lled by not earlier than 2020. 
2. Th e long-term infl ation rate
As mentioned above, the authors of the present paper share frequently expressed 
view that consumer price index (CPI) allows to assess stability of national currency fairly 
enough. Respective data are depicted on Figure 7. On average Chinese annual infl ation 
rate in 1999–2013 equaled to 2.08 % in comparison with 2.41 %, in case of the USA and 
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2.14 % in case of EU. At the same time, Chinese infl ation rate demonstrated much higher 
volatility than American and European ones generating certain concerns and reservations 
with respect to fulfi llment of this criterion.
Figure 7. Infl ation in China, the USA and the European Union in 1999–2013, %
S o u r c e s : [Eurostat, 2015; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2015; US Infl ation calculator, 2015]. 
3. Th e country’s position as an international lender.
Figure 8 shows a signifi cant increase in surplus of Chinese capital transactions during 
last decade. Th is trend is twice as signifi cant against the background of growing American 
defi cit turning the United States into a net importer of capital.
Figure 8. Net assets of International Investment Position of China and the USA in 2004–
2013, bln USD
S o u r c e s : [State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 2015; Th e Statistics Portal, 2015]. 
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Taking all these facts under consideration one might conclude that in general China 
with certain reservations was very close to meet the second out of three above-mentioned 
criteria to check the maturity of its national currency for internationalization. 
Naturity of Chinese fi nancial markets
In spite of all discussed above, measures aimed at liberalization of the Chinese 
fi nancial system, in particular development of primary and the secondary capital markets, 
increasing their liquidity as well as degree of transparency, these markets in China are 
still immature in comparison with international standards. Th is fully applies to both 
stock and bond markets characterized by certain restrictions for fi nancial intermediaries. 
Furthermore, market participants carry out high transaction costs. Comparative analysis 
made by the China Securities Regulatory Commission [CSRC, 2014] showed that the 
average transaction costs of operations at Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges equaled 
to 50 basis points against 21 basis points in case of developed markets. Th e main obstacle 
to a real internationalization of the RMB is a system of foreign exchange control which 
prevents free movement of capital into and out of country and does not allow setting up 
suffi  ciently liquid and transparent market. 
3.2. Does China succeed in internationalization of its currency?
To sum up, one might argue that being totally in line with the fi rst and largely 
corresponding to the second criteria to check the maturity of its national currency for 
internationalization China do not meet the third one. In other words, the Chinese fi nancial 
system is roughly as ready for a complete liberalization of RMB as the Japan’s system was 
in 1984 prepared for Yen liberalization. Meanwhile, unlike Japanese counterparts Chinese 
authorities are on their own original conceptual track and manage to avoid accelerated 
liberalization of national fi nancial system. Th anks to that they are better equipped 
to prevent both massive infl ows of “hot money” from abroad and the emergence of 
speculative bubbles. At the same time, no complete control exists as there is a substantial 
segment of fi nancial intermediaries in the domestic market operating formally beyond the 
jurisdiction of the People’s Bank of China. 
In order, on the one hand, to solve partial RMB convertibility and fi nancial market 
immaturity problems, on the other hand, unwilling to put the latter into dependence 
upon foreign fi nancial institutions, the Chinese leaders decided to create a market of 
“off shore Yuan.” In a sense, this is a new currency issued by the same People’s Bank of 
China and circulating outside of the mainland China, especially in Hong Kong, Singapore 
and London. International experts informally assigned “off shore Yuan” under conditional 
code CNH3. Its main sources are [City, 2012]:
1. Import contracts payments (in case Yuan is a currency of the contract) as well as 
RMB foreign investment.
2. Export of cash overseas by investors or tourists.
3. Purchases of Yuan by Hong Kong residents for subsequent placement in deposits 
in Hong Kong’ banks.
4. Clearing transactions of the People’s Bank of China with HKMA (Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority). 
3 Chinese Yuan delivered in Hong Кong.
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 5. Экономика. 2016. Вып. 1 39
Th anks to establishing and enhancing of “off shore Yuan” China is able to enjoy the 
benefi ts of a mature effi  cient market. At the same time, monetary authorities so far manage 
to maintain relative fi nancial stability in the mainland China. Nevertheless, even taking 
under consideration above-mentioned decision to include Yuan in SDR basket4, resulting 
from “off shore Yuan” inability to build up fast enough a signifi cant amount of liquidity in 
RMB, that would not allow Yuan to begin in the nearest future the real competition with 
USD for a status of reserve currency in East Asia, say nothing about global competition 
with USD and EUR. 
Meanwhile, currently the world economy is very unstable; the probability of a new 
wave of the global fi nancial crisis is high enough. In this dramatic case, relative share 
of fi nancial resources needed to serve international trade might increase substantially. 
Assuming the fact that nowadays “off shore Yuan” mainly supports trade in goods, above-
mentioned fl aw might turn into advantage. Under the circumstances one cannot totally 
exclude a sharp increase of interest in this currency for diversifi cation of foreign exchange 
risks. Th is would substantially accelerate the ongoing process of Yuan internationalization. 
Conclusion
Th e initial stage in internationalization of the Japanese Yen in the 1970s occurred 
without deliberately designed participation of national authorities. Th is issue came into the 
agenda of the Japanese Government only in the 1980s within the framework of fi nancial 
system liberalization, aft er the country had become the second largest economy of “the 
West”. Th e main obstacle to the overall internationalization of the Yen was immaturity of 
the fi nancial market. Despite the initial success, the liberalization of Japan’s fi nancial system 
(launched by the intergovernmental agreement between Japan and the United States in 
1984) ultimately resulted neither in further strengthening of Japanese economic position 
on the global stage, nor in strengthening of the position of Yen in overseas markets. Th e 
main reason for this failure was US political pressure that imposed accelerated opening 
of fi nancial markets and largely reduced capabilities of Japan to counter speculative 
capital infl ows from abroad. Th e latter ultimately displaced long-term internal productive 
investments. As a consequence, in the early 1990s global expansion of the Japanese banks 
and corporations stopped; the country experienced progressive outfl ow of capital and 
stagnation of the national economy for more than two decades. Currently, there are no 
real prospects for strengthening of Yen as an international currency. 
Th e internationalization of RMB since 2009  has proceeded largely in line with 
deliberately designed strategy. A core of the latter is an idea of a parallel co-functioning 
of two fi nancial circuits. Th e fi rst one is external. It supplies Chinese foreign trade and 
serves as the main channel of the RMB circulation outside China. Th e second circuit is 
internal, primarily serving the domestic market. Yuan exiting from the second circuit 
and ending up outside the mainland China  — “off shore Yuan”  — can without any 
restrictions circulate on international fi nancial markets, both as a medium or payment 
and a reserve currency. Th e “off shore Yuan” may return into the fi rst circuit (transforming 
into “ordinary Yuan”), either in a form of material resources imported into China or in 
4 It could be considered as a direct support by US government (as a key decision-maker in the IMF) of 
Chinese policy aimed at RMB internationalization and encouragement to accelerate the process. 
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a form of investments under the state control. Despite the fact that Chinese economy at 
the moment does not fully meet all criteria to check the maturity of its national currency 
for internationalization, national authorities manage to move towards the goal of RMB 
internationalization simultaneously securing its fi nancial system against excessive risks. 
At the same time, regardless of the IMF decision to include Yuan in SDR basket, RMB in 
the nearest future will not be able to compete with USD for a status of reserve currency in 
East Asia, say nothing about global competition with USD and EUR.
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